Employment protection, temporary contracts and firm-provided training: Evidence from Italy by BRATTI MASSIMILIANO et al.
E
t
p
I
 
 
 
 
mpl
emp
rov
taly 
JRC 
oym
ora
ided
Workin
ent
ry c
 tra
g Pape
 pro
ontr
ining
rs in E
 
tect
acts
: E
conom
ion,
 and
vide
Bratti, Mas
Conti, Mau
Sulis, Giov
2018
ics and
 
 fir
nce 
similiano 
rizio 
anni 
 Finan
m-
from
ce, 201
 
8/2 
This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science 
and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking 
process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither 
the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that 
might be made of this publication. 
Contact information  
Name: Massimiliano Bratti 
Address: Via E. Fermi 2749, TP 361 Ispra (VA), I-21027, Italy 
Email: massimiliano.bratti@ec.europa.ec 
Tel.: +39 0332 785182 
JRC Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
JRC110580 
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-79983-9 ISSN 2467-2203 doi: 10.2760/103433 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018 
© European Union, 2018 
Reuse is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. The reuse policy of European Commission 
documents is regulated by Decision 2011/833/EU (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39).
For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EU copyright, permission must be 
sought directly from the copyright holders.
How to cite this report: Bratti, M., Conti, M. and Sulis, G. Employment protection, temporary contracts and 
firm-provided training: Evidence from Italy, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg,  
ISBN 978-92-79-79983-9, doi: 10.2760/103433, JRC110580
All images © European Union 2018 
Employment Protection, Temporary Contracts
and Firm-provided Training: Evidence from Italy
Massimiliano Bratti∗ Maurizio Conti† Giovanni Sulis‡
February 13, 2018
Abstract
In this study, we leverage on Italy’s size-contingent firing restrictions to identify the
causal effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on firm-provided training us-
ing a regression discontinuity design. Our analysis demonstrates that higher levels of
EPL reduce incentives for firms to invest in workers’ training. The number of trained
workers falls by about 1.5-1.9 units at the threshold: this is not a negligible effect, corre-
sponding to a 16-20% reduction in the number of trained workers. The results are robust
to several sensitivity checks and controls for potential confounding factors (e.g. work
councils). The effect of EPL on training is not mediated by different levels of invest-
ment in physical capital or propensities to innovate, while it is mostly accounted for by
higher worker turnover and more use of temporary contracts, which entail less training,
in firms with higher firing costs. Our study highlights the potential adverse effects of
EPL on worker training in dual labour markets, owing to larger firms seeking to avoid
the higher costs of EPL by means of temporary contracts.
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1 Introduction
On-the-job training is a fundamental source of human capital accumulation and, as such,
is very high on the policy agenda (Brunello et al. 2007, OECD 2014).1 Both workers and
firms benefit from training: workers benefit in terms of higher skills, higher productivity
and, consequently, higher wages, while firms enjoy returns to training in the form of higher
productivity.2 As workers and firms both benefit from investments in training, in imperfect
labour markets they are also likely to share their costs.
In their review article on the effect of imperfect labour markets on firm-sponsored train-
ing, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) called for the need to increase the number of empirical
studies to distinguish between competitive and non-competitive theories of training, possi-
bly leveraging on policy-induced variation in market imperfections. In this paper, we follow
their suggestion and throw light on a relatively underexplored source of labour market im-
perfections: employment protection legislation (EPL). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b), for
instance, emphasised that non-competitive labour markets and firing restrictions generate
rents that are an increasing function of worker training: stricter levels of EPL might there-
fore foster incentives for firms to increase expenditure in worker training.
The Italian legislation, which envisages size-contingent firing restrictions — according
to which firing costs increase sharply above the 15-employee threshold — gives us a unique
opportunity to provide clean causal evidence on the effect of EPL on training using a sharp
regression discontinuity design (RDD). In Section 3.1 we discuss why these policy-induced
differences in employment protection are able to substantially differentiate firing costs ac-
cording to firm size. This is a timely moment to add new evidence, given the paucity of stud-
ies that have empirically investigated the interplay between EPL and firm-provided training
(see Section 2), and in the light of several reforms that have reduced employment protection
— especially at the margin, i.e. for temporary workers — in many countries.3
Our paper demonstrates that, contrary to what simple economic intuition may suggest,
higher EPL — and lower worker turnover — is not necessarily associated with higher firm-
provided training in contexts characterised by dual labour markets.4 The co-existence of
contracts that entail different levels of protection induces firms that face higher firing costs
1 Mincer (1962) estimates that around half of human capital accumulation over the life cycle is related to
investment in training at the workplace.
2 Haelermans and Borghans (2012) conduct a meta-analysis, which shows that the average reported effect
on wages of on-the-job training, corrected for publication bias, is 2.6 per cent per course.
3 On labour market liberalisation reforms at the margin, see, for example, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and
Berton and Garibaldi (2012).
4 In reality, predictions from economic theory are not clear-cut (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a).
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(i.e. larger firms in the Italian context) to make more extensive use of temporary workers,
who are less protected by the legislation (Hijzen et al. 2017, Pierre and Scarpetta 2013,
Cabrales et al. 2017). However, temporary workers receive less training.
The main results of our paper can be summarised as follows. The baseline estimate sug-
gests that EPL reduces the number of trained workers by about 1.5-1.9 units at the thresh-
old. This is not a negligible effect and corresponds to a 16-20 per cent reduction in the
number of trained workers. The effect of EPL on training does not appear to be mediated
by different levels of investment in physical capital or propensities to innovate, while it is
mostly accounted for by higher worker turnover and more use of temporary contracts in firms
with higher firing costs. Our study therefore points to the potential adverse effects of EPL
on worker training in dual labour markets, owing to firms’ attempts to reduce firing costs
through the use of temporary contracts. It also provides a potential explanation for the fall in
productivity that has been observed in some EU economies after the labour market reforms
that reduced EPL for temporary workers (Damiani et al. 2016).
These findings can be explained by noting that, first, in dual labour markets, firms tend
to avoid the higher firing costs associated with permanent positions by relying more on a se-
quence of temporary contracts (Cahuc et al. 2016). Second, in dual labour markets, outside
employment opportunities for workers hired on temporary contracts could increase more
than their productivity after receiving training, thus reducing the incentive for firms to pro-
vide training. This, in turn, may happen because trained workers in temporary contracts may
easily find a better (e.g. permanent) employment opportunity outside the firm that provided
the training (the employee’s productivity is higher thanks to training and therefore they ap-
peal to other firms that want to save on training costs).5 Another mechanism explaining why
EPL may reduce training in the presence of temporary contracts is highlighted by Cabrales
et al. (2017) and Dolado et al. (2016). Their basic insight is that firms can use the conver-
sion of temporary to permanent contracts to push workers to increase the effort they put into
the job. An increase in the differential in EPL between permanent and temporary contracts,
under reasonable assumptions, causes permanent workers to reduce the effort they put into
the job (e.g. through higher absenteeism, as suggested by Ichino et al. 2003), which leads
firms to reduce the rate of converting temporary to permanent jobs. This entails, in turn, a
reduction in the effort that temporary workers put into the job (as the likelihood of conver-
5 Using the European Community Housenold Panel (ECHP) data, Kahn (2012) shows that workers in
temporary jobs make more effort to search for a new job than do those in permanent jobs. Moreover, Akgündüz
and van Huizen (2015) demonstrate that, in dual labour markets, where the probability of quitting is higher for
temporary workers, the incentive for firms to provide training is related to job match quality.
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sion is lower) and a reduction in the level of firm-provided training to temporary workers
endogenously chosen by firms.6 Thus, our study also speaks to the growing literature on
the (possibly) perverse economic effects associated with two-tier reforms of employment
protection (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007).
We make three main contributions to the existing literature, which is discussed in more
detail in Section 2. First, we provide new and clean evidence on the effects of EPL on
training in Italy using different measures of training and data sources compared with previous
studies. Second, we explicitly show that for a country characterised by very stringent EPL for
permanent workers and persistent dualism in the labour market, such as Italy, the excessive
use of temporary contracts and the short duration of employment spells is one of the main
determinants of the incentives for firms to (not) provide training. Third, we employ the
non-parametric local polynomial estimation method of Calonico et al. (2014), which uses
data-driven non-parametric regressions to select the optimal bandwidth around the threshold
and which does not consider the local polynomial regression as correctly specified. In so
doing, we avoid ad-hoc and subjective choices, which could affect the RDD results.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the related literature.
In Section 3 we introduce the institutional framework and present our identification strategy.
After discussing the data in Section 4, we present our main results, some robustness checks
and a discussion of potential confounding factors and mechanisms in Section 5. Section 6
summarises the main findings and draws conclusions.
2 Past Literature
This paper is related to different strands of literature. First, it is related to theoretical studies
dealing with incentives to invest in human capital by firms and workers. After seminal work
by Becker (1964), more recent studies show that, in imperfectly competitive environments
where labour market institutions are at work, firms (and workers) may have incentives to
invest in general training. Papers by Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b)
show that, when labour market institutions, such as EPL, generate wage compression, firms
may have more incentive to pay for training. This is because labour market imperfections,
such as search frictions, information asymmetries and labour market institutions, determine
the gap between a worker’s marginal product and her wage, thus generating rents to be shared
6 Booth et al. (2002) show that temporary workers increase their effort when career prospects improve, i.e.
when conversion rates into permanent positions are higher.
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between workers and firms. Moreover, labour market imperfections reduce the outside op-
tion of workers so that wages increase less than productivity for trained workers. A necessary
condition for firms to sponsor (general) training is that these rents are increasing in training
(Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b). In a similar vein, Wasmer (2006) shows that in an envi-
ronment with search frictions, when EPL is high and turnover is low, workers may have an
incentive to invest more in specific skills than in general skills.7
Second, this paper is related to more recent empirical contributions on the relationship
between employment protection and training.8 Simple economic reasoning suggests that, by
increasing the time horizon in which the firm can reap the economic benefits of worker train-
ing, stricter EPL should increase firm-provided training. However, the empirical evidence
does not always point in this direction. Using a large firm-level dataset across developing
countries, Almeida and Aterido (2011) show that stricter enforcement of labour regulations
is strongly associated with higher investments of firms in their employees’ human capital,
but that the effect is very small. Similarly, Pierre and Scarpetta (2013) use cross-country
harmonised survey data and find that higher EPL is associated with higher investment in
training and more use of temporary contracts. They also find that EPL has larger effects
on small firms and in sectors characterised by greater job reallocation. Furthermore, studies
exploiting within-country variation in levels of EPL do not find strong positive effects of
EPL on training. For instance, Picchio and van Ours (2011) use Dutch data for manufactur-
ing firms and find that higher labour market flexibility (i.e. lower EPL) marginally reduces
firms’ investment in training; however, this effect is rather small. A recent study by Messe
and Rouland (2014) exploits a reform of EPL in France to identify, using a difference-in-
differences approach combined with propensity scores methods, the effect of EPL on the
incentive for firms to pay for training. They find that higher EPL (in the form of a tax on
firings) had no effect on the training of older eligible workers, while it had a positive effect
on workers just below the eligibility threshold. The authors interpret this finding as stressing
the complementarity between training and firing decisions.
The paper most closely related to ours is Bolli and Kemper (2015), in which the authors
use a regression discontinuity design framework exploiting variation in firing regulations
across size thresholds in Italy and Finland to study the relationship between EPL and train-
7 See Belot et al. (2007), Fella (2005) and Lechthaler (2009) for other papers that look at the welfare-
increasing effects of EPL and training in a search and matching environment.
8 The literature on the various effects of EPL is vast and cannot be reviewed here. See Messina and Vallanti
(2007) for the effects of EPL on job flows, Bassanini et al. (2009) for EPL and productivity, Cingano et al.
(2010) and Cingano et al. (2016) for EPL and investment, Schivardi and Torrini (2008) for EPL and firms’
propensity to grow, Leonardi and Pica (2013) for EPL and wages, Kugler and Pica (2008) for EPL and worker
flows, and Bottasso et al. (2017) for EPL and firm dynamics.
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ing provision. Their RDD results for Italy point to a statistically significant negative effect
of stricter EPL on the extensive margin of training (i.e. a dichotomous indicator for having
provided training).9 However, there is no effect on the intensive margin (amount of paid
training hours). We add to their analysis by using a much richer dataset, which, in addi-
tion to providing different indicators for training (e.g. number of trained workers, training
expenditures, source of financing of training), also gathers information on several potential
confounding factors (e.g. presence of work councils in the firm or the presence of workers
under the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni scheme, a short-time work programme featuring a
redundancy fund system). Moreover, we also have information on firms’ physical capital in-
vestments, innovation activities and use of temporary contracts, which helps us disentangle
the potential sources of the EPL effects on training.10 Finally, our paper is also different, as
we use the non-parametric local polynomial estimation method suggested by Calonico et al.
(2014).
Third, our paper is related to two recent studies that, in the cases of Spain and Italy,
analyse the effects of EPL on training by type of contract (temporary vs permanent) and on
the composition of the labour force. Cabrales et al. (2017) use the PIAAC survey data and
document a large gap in training provisions for temporary and permanent workers in Spain,
characterised by persistent dualism in the labour market. In this environment, lower levels of
EPL for temporary workers reduce expected job duration, increasing turnover for this group
of workers, thereby reducing the incentive for firms to invest in training. On the contrary,
permanent workers benefit from higher levels of training, as firms find it profitable to invest
in their workers’ skills. Hence, employment protection is related to training depending on
the composition of the labour force. In the case of Italy, Hijzen et al. (2017) exploit variation
in EPL across firms of different sizes and find that higher levels of EPL result in excessive
worker turnover and that this effect is entirely due to the excessive use of temporary contracts.
Moreover, they show that, by increasing excessive worker turnover, stricter EPL also has
negative effects on labour productivity.
9 The estimates are, however, very sensitive to the degree of the polynomial, going from −0.44 to −0.06
for cubic and quadratic polynomials, respectively.
10 This could not be done by Bolli and Kemper (2015) because, as the authors stress, their data only pro-
vide information on whether firms have temporary workers or not and only on firms that train some of their
employees.
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3 Institutional Framework and Identification
3.1 Institutional framework
Since the 1960s, the regulation of unfair dismissals has changed several times in Italy. The
most significant reform occurred in 1970 with Law 300-70, also known as ‘Statuto dei Lavo-
ratori’ (Workers’ Statute) and, in 1990, with Law 108/1990, which strengthened employees’
protection from unfair dismissal only in the case of small firms.11
Before the legislative changes that occurred in 2012 and 2014, the degree of protection
enjoyed by unfairly dismissed workers was considerably greater in the case of employees
working in firms with more than 15 employees. Indeed, if a dismissal was declared unfair by
a judge, the employee unfairly dismissed from a firm with more than 15 employees could ask
to be reinstated and receive the wages forgone and the health and social security contributions
(for a minimum of 5 months) related to the period between the dismissal and the sentence.
Although reinstatement was the most likely occurrence in practice, the unfairly dismissed
employee retained the right to instead receive a severance payment amounting to 15 months’
salary. In contrast, in the case of firms with fewer than 15 employees, it was up to the
employer to choose whether to reinstate the unfairly dismissed worker (without paying any
forgone wages) or make a severance payment, which ranged from 2.5 to 14 months in the
case of very senior workers (Hijzen et al. 2017).12
The higher de jure costs for employers in the case of firms with more than 15 employees
are further increased if one also takes into consideration the de facto costs associated with the
very long average duration of labour trials in Italy: Gianfreda and Vallanti (2017) report av-
erage trial decisions of about 850 days over the period 2007-2010, with large variation across
regions.13 Such a difference in the length of labour trials lead to escalating firing costs above
the threshold. Indeed, using a formula proposed by Garibaldi and Violante (2005) to com-
pute ex post firing costs, Gianfreda and Vallanti (2017) report firing costs equivalent to about
36 months’ wages in Trento versus 160 months in Salerno for a blue-collar worker with 8
years of tenure in a firm above the 15-employee threshold.14 Because below the threshold
11 See Cingano et al. (2016) and Hijzen et al. (2017) for a brief overview of legislative changes that occurred
between 1960 and 2012.
12 Above the 15-employee threshold, employment protection is also greater in the case of collective dis-
missals.
13 For instance, Gianfreda and Vallanti (2017) report an average length of labour trials of 313 days in Trento,
in the north of Italy, versus 1397 days in Salerno, in the south of the country.
14 If one takes into account the expected probability of a settlement between the parties and the fact that
some rulings are decided in favour of the firm, the ex ante firing costs fall to about 15 months of wages in
Trento, compared with 65 months in Salerno. The formula is based on the time it takes to reach a sentence, the
forgone wage, the health and social security contributions, the penalty rate on forgone contributions, the legal
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no forgone wages are due, the length of labour trials matters only above the threshold, with
firing costs rapidly increasing above the 15-employee threshold if the labour trial lasts longer
than 5 months.15 Moreover, the lack of a clear definition of unfair dismissal in Italian legisla-
tion (Hijzen et al. 2017) led to some inconsistencies in its implementation, as noted by Ichino
et al. (2003), who showed that, in regions with high unemployment rates, judges tended to
rule in favour of employees. The variability in decisions therefore led to uncertainty, which
further increased the costs associated with the stricter employment protection for firms above
the threshold.
So far we have discussed only employment protection for open-ended contracts. How-
ever, as in other countries, such as Spain or France, the Italian labour market has in the past
15 years been characterised by a notable increase in the use of temporary and atypical labour
contracts, following the liberalisation that started at the end of 1980s (in the case of tempo-
rary contracts), and at the end of the 1990s in the case of semi-autonomous atypical workers.
It is, however, important to note that the degree of employment protection for temporary and
atypical workers does not change discontinuously at the 15-employee threshold: indeed, it
does not depend at all on firm size.16
In contrast, there are regulations that change discontinuously at the 15-employee thresh-
old, the most important being the right to form a worker council, which is granted to firms
with more than 15 employees. Previous empirical evidence discussed in Schivardi and Tor-
rini (2008) suggests, however, that the establishment of worker councils does not seem to
change discontinuously at the 15-employee threshold, although the proportion of firms with
a worker council does seem to grow with size. As we have information on the existence of a
worker council within firms, in the next sections we will show that our results are robust to
controlling for its presence in the RDD analysis.
Finally, it is important to note that, according to Italian legislation, part-time workers
count as less than one full-time employee in defining the firm size, which is relevant for the
application of EPL. By way of example, a firm with 16 employees, three of which have a
50% part-time contract, would be equivalent to a firm with 14.5 full time employees, and is
therefore de facto below the 15-employee threshold. Similarly, only temporary employees
with at least a 9-month contract should be considered as far as the definition of the threshold
is concerned. This issue is further discussed in Section 5.1.
fees and the severance payments. See Garibaldi and Violante (2005) for the exact formula.
15 Indeed, 5 months is the minimum amount of forgone wages and contributions that the unfairly dismissed
worker has the right to receive in firms above the threshold.
16 See Cahuc et al. (2016) for a model explaining the spread of temporary jobs in dual labour markets.
8
3.2 Identification strategy
In this study, we identify the effect of employment protection on firm-provided training by
exploiting the discontinuous change in the degree of regulation of unfair dismissals at the
15-employee threshold, using a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) framework. In
particular, we employ the non-parametric local polynomial estimation method of Calonico
et al. (2014), which has recently been gaining popularity in the applied literature.17
Relative to the parametric method, which is based on ad hoc chosen bandwidths and
which assumes away any misspecification bias in both estimation and inference, the approach
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) presents three notable characteristics: first, the bandwidth
is chosen using a data-driven procedure on the basis of a non-parametric approximation;
second, the resulting point RDD estimator is asymptotically optimal in a mean squared error
sense; and third, inference is conducted without the assumption that the local polynomial
regression is correctly specified. In practical terms, the researcher needs to specify a given
polynomial order and a specific kernel: the bandwidth is chosen in such a way that it trades
off the lower variance associated with a larger bandwidth, with the higher bias associated
with the increasingly poor parametric polynomial approximation when observations far away
from the threshold are included in the analysis. More specifically, the bandwidth is chosen
to minimise the mean squared error of the RDD estimator.
After selecting the optimal bandwidth (in a mean squared error sense), Calonico et al.
(2014)’s procedure amounts, in our case, to running the following weighted least squares
regression:
Yi = a+ τ(Di)+β1(E˜i)+β2(E˜i)2+λ1(E˜iDi)+λ2(E˜iDi)2+ui (1)
where Di is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms above the threshold; Yi is a variable
measuring training, e.g. the number of workers that have received training in the firm i.18
E˜i represents employment recentred so that it equals zero in the case of firms with exactly
15 employees (i.e. E˜i = Ei− 15) and we allow up to a polynomial of order two,19 with
possibly different coefficients on both sides of the threshold. τ represents the RDD effect of
17 For recent studies that have used the Calonico et al. (2014)’s approach, see, for example, Stampini et al.
(2018), Kantorowicz (2017) and Bhalotra et al. (2017).
18 Cingano et al. (2016) note that, in an RDD setting, one should not normalise the outcome variable by
the forcing variable. In some robustness checks, however, we provide some evidence showing that the main
results do not substantially change if we use, as the dependent variable, the proportion of workers who received
training.
19 Following the recommendation of Gelman and Imbens (2017), we have considered only quadratic and
linear polynomials.
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employment protection on training.
The type of weights depend on the specific kernel considered in the analysis. As sug-
gested by Calonico et al. (2014), we consider the triangular kernel, which gives a weight of
zero to observations outside the bandwidth and a positive weight, which declines linearly
and symmetrically with distance from the threshold, to observations inside the bandwidth.20
Calonico et al. (2014) note that the regression function is misspecified by construction near
the cut-off point and that the optimal bandwidth (in the mean squared error sense) is too
large for the misspecification bias to be of second-order importance for inference purposes.
They estimate the bias and modify the confidence interval by recentring and rescaling the
point estimator so that inference can be conducted with a robust p-value that accounts for
the bias.21
In this study, we therefore estimate the RDD effect by considering the robust bias-
corrected confidence interval approach of Calonico et al. (2014).22 In particular, we do
not impose a symmetric bandwidth around the threshold and we deal with the discrete nature
of our forcing variable23 by clustering standard errors, using the number of employees as
the cluster identifier, as suggested by Lee and Card (2008). Moreover, we show that our key
results are not sensitive to an alternative methodology for selecting the bandwidth, namely
the coverage error optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico et al. (2017), or to a different
kernel.24
Another important point to discuss at this stage is that the forcing variable, i.e. self-
reported firm size, is characterised by non-random heaping problems at multiples of 5 (see
Section 5.1), perhaps because of rounding by the individual that was interviewed in the firm.
Barreca et al. (2016) present and discuss simulation evidence suggesting that neglecting
non-random heaping can lead to important biases and that omitting observations at data
heaps should lead to unbiased estimates of the treatment effects for the ‘non-heaped types’.
Authors also note that keeping data heaps in the analysis that are far away from the threshold
20 We consider the triangular kernel because Cattaneo et al. (2017) note that, for a bandwidth that is optimally
chosen according to a mean square error criterion, the triangular kernel leads to a point estimator with optimal
properties in MSE sense. However, in the robustness check, we also control that results do not depend on the
specific kernel choice.
21 See Cattaneo et al. (2017) for an in-depth discussion.
22 This is implemented using the rdrobust routine for STATA described in Calonico et al. (2017).
23 For training, we have information only for the year 2009, and in that year we do not have information for
either part-time or temporary employees (those with a contract of less than 9 months), but we do for the total
number of employees. As a robustness check, we show that the results are robust to dropping firms with 16
employees, which might indeed be spuriously considered to be above the threshold if they have two or more
part-time employees.
24 All regressions were run using sample weights to ensure that results are representative of the population
of firms in Italy. Baseline results are, however, robust to not weighting.
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but still within the bandwidth may, again, be misleading. For these reasons, our main analysis
is conducted by dropping firms with a number of employees equal to every multiple of five
up to 95, which is in the right tail of the forcing variable distribution, when a second-degree
polynomial is used.25
The assumption underlying the validity of any RDD method is that firms do not sort
below the size threshold, and so their characteristics should not change sharply around the
threshold and the density of the forcing variable should not be characterised by any discon-
tinuity around the cut-off. We will discuss the validity of the RDD identification strategy in
our data in Section 5.1.
4 Data
We use data from the ISFOL-RIL Survey (‘Rilevazione Longitudinale su Imprese e La-
voro’).26 For the year 2010, the sample comprises about 24,000 firms in the national ter-
ritory, extracted from the universe of Italian firms ASIA (Archivio Statistico Imprese Attive),
which is made available by ISTAT (the Italian Statistical Institute). The sampling procedure
is based on firm size and it is representative of the population of both the limited liability
companies and partnerships in the private (non-agricultural) sectors.27
The dataset contains information on indicators of firm size, performance, training and
additional variables related to the industrial relations system. A peculiar characteristic of
the data is that they contain detailed information on training activities, which is usually
unavailable in administrative data on firms or workers. In particular, we know if job training
activities have been carried out at the firm level, the number of workers trained, the type of
training activities (e.g. coaching, counselling, outdoor training), who provided the training
(i.e. external companies, specialised consulting firms or others), who paid for the training
(i.e. the firm, the firm with partial coverage from external funding, external contributions),
25 Reassuringly, results are robust even if we drop multiples of five up to 145 employees or in the range of
5-30 only, which is precisely where heaping problems seem to be more severe.
26 ISFOL is the acronym for the Istituto per lo sviluppo della formazione professionale dei lavoratori (Insti-
tute for development and training of workers). The institute has been recently named INAPP (Istituto Nazionale
per l’Analisi delle Politiche Pubbliche) and its main activities are oriented towards research, monitoring and
public policy evaluation. It constitutes a building block in supporting policy making by the Ministry of Labour
and Social Policies.
27 The survey was conducted in 2005, 2007 and 2010, and a panel version of the dataset is, in principle,
available for a limited number of firms. However, to identify the effects of interest, we decided to use only the
2010 wave. The reasons for this choice are twofold. First, the panel version of the dataset comprises only a very
limited number of firms that were surveyed in all 3 years (less than 20% of the total), entailing too big a loss
in terms of observations and issues of sample representativeness. Second, in 2005 and 2007, different industry
classifications were adopted, leading to an important loss of details with respect to the industry classification
used in 2010.
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who provided external contributions and the expenditure on training. Further information
is available on the presence of unions (work councils) in the workplace and the level of
bargaining and contractual labour agreements. The survey also contains information on the
composition of the workforce in terms of skills and types of contracts for workers. On the
firm side, although the dataset is quite rich in terms of variables related to firms activity, such
as their export, innovation or offshoring, only limited information is available concerning
balance sheet data. We have, nonetheless, information on the expenditure on physical capital
investment and sales.28
In what follows, we describe our sample selection procedure. We begin with 24,459
observations for the year 2010. We first drop firms that have below zero (or an abnormal
number of) employees in 2010 (no observations) and in 2009 (196 observations).29 After
the above selection we end up with 24,263 observations. In Table 1, in the top panel, we
report descriptives for the full sample and for the two samples used in baseline regressions
(reported in rows I and II of Table 3).30
[Table 1 about here]
5 Results
5.1 Validity of the regression discontinuity design
Although previous studies have already demonstrated the lack of a substantial self-sorting of
firms at, or below, the 15-employee threshold (Schivardi and Torrini 2008, Leonardi and Pica
2013, Hijzen et al. 2017), above which the costs of EPL substantially increase in Italy (see
Section 3.1), in this section we look for evidence of manipulation of the running variable
(i.e. firm employment) in our data. First, we formally test whether the density function of
firm size exhibits a discontinuity at 15 employees, using the procedure proposed by McCrary
(2008). Second, following both Schivardi and Torrini (2008) and a standard RDD, we also
check whether or not firms just below the 15-employee threshold are less likely to raise
employment to avoid larger firing costs.
28 Devicienti et al. (2017) use ISFOL-RIL data as a primary source of information to study the relationship
between unions and temporary contracts. Using social security codes, the authors are able to match their data
with additional information on balance sheets. Unfortunately, for confidentiality reasons, the current version of
the dataset does not contain social security codes and does not allow us to match other sources of data.
29 Note that, although the reference year in our data is 2010, important variables related to training refer to
the previous year, i.e. 2009. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 5.1.
30 Note that we consider only firms in the endogenously chosen bandwidth interval and that we drop obser-
vations related to heaping. See Section 5.2 for more details.
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[Figure 1 about here]
In the ISFOL-RIL survey, firm size is provided in discrete units, i.e. head counts. Com-
position of employment, in terms of part-time and full-time workers and type of contracts
is provided only for 2010, while information on training is provided only for 2009, i.e. the
year before. For this reason, we cannot build a continuous measure of employment in 2009
using proxy measures of the legal definition of firm size, as did Leonardi and Pica (2013)
or Hijzen et al. (2017).31 Accordingly, we implement the McCrary test using one-employee
bins. The histogram of the density of firm size is shown in the left panel of Figure 1 and
shows a fall in the frequency from 15 to 16, which is, however, not very different from those
observed in other parts of the distribution, e.g. from 5 to 6 or from 10 to 11. Heaping at
multiples of five, when self-reporting firm size in the ISFOL-RIL survey, may be partly re-
sponsible for these drops (see the discussion in Section 3.2). The McCrary test is visualised
in the right panel of Figure 1 with separate weighted kernel estimations and 95% confidence
intervals of the logarithm of density of firm size on either side of the cut-off. In spite of the
non-negligible heaping at 15 employees, which should make it more likely to under-reject
the null of no discontinuity in the density (producing a mass point at 15 employees), the test
gives a log difference between the frequencies to the right and the left of 15 employees of
−0.054 (s.e.= 0.074) statistically insignificant at the 5% level.
The McCrary test is based on aggregated bin data and not on individual firm size distri-
butions, and it has low power when selection around the cut-off is not monotonic but occurs
in both directions.32 To address this issue, in Table 2 we follow Schivardi and Torrini (2008)
and report the results of another test of firms’ self-sorting below the threshold (i.e. manipu-
lation of firm size), based on individual firms’ likelihoods of growing in size.
We carry out the test by estimating the following equation using a linear probability
model (LPM)
Pr(Eit > Eit−1) = α+
n
∑
j=1
β jlE
j
it−1+
n
∑
j=1
β jr(E jit−1 ·Dit−1)+
15
∑
k=13
γkDkit−1+βxXit+ vit (2)
31 Some studies, for instance, count part-time workers as half a worker when computing firm sizes.
32 However, Hijzen et al. (2017) observe that there is no particular reason why small firms may want to sort
above the 15-employee threshold.
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with
Dit−1 = 1[Eit−1 ≤ 15];
Dkit−1 = 1[Eit−1 = k] for k = 13,14,15.
Eit−1 and Eit is firm size in year t−1 (2009) and t (2010), respectively; Dkit−1s are a set
of bin dummies, with bin size equal to 1 (namely for sizes 13, 14 and 15 employees); Dit−1
is a dummy equal to 1 if lagged firm size was not above the 15-employee threshold; Xit is a
vector of firm characteristics and vit is a firm-level error term. The polynomial of firm size
captures parametrically the underlying relationship between firm size and the probability of
employment growth in the absence of employment protection, while the bin dummies can be
interpreted as the threshold effect of EPL on firms’ employment growth.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 2 show the results of this test using polynomials of different
orders on the sample of firms with 6−25 employees.33 Bin dummies for 13, 14 and 15 em-
ployees are never statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the 14-employee
bin with a linear polynomial.
[Table 2 about here]
We complement the evidence on manipulation by also reporting, in columns (5)-(8) of
Table 2, the results of a more standard parametric RDD specification
Pr(Eit > Eit−1) = α+ γDit−1+
n
∑
j=1
β jlE˜
j
it−1+
n
∑
j=1
β jr(E˜ jit−1 ·Dit−1)+βxXit+ vit . (3)
with E˜it−1 = Eit−1−15, i.e. firm employment normalised with respect to the cut-off.
The coefficient of the cut-off indicator (γ) is never statistically significant, with a magni-
tude in absolute value increasing in the degree of the polynomial.
Overall, the results of these checks are consistent with the absence of strong manipulation
of firm size found in earlier papers investigating the effects of EPL in Italy using adminis-
trative data to define firm employment. It is worth stressing once again that the outcomes of
these tests could be partly affected by heaping observed in our self-reported data. In partic-
ular, heaping, by creating a mass point at 15 employees, should make it less likely that the
null of no manipulation is rejected.
33 Similar bandwidths are used by Leonardi and Pica (2013) and Hijzen et al. (2017) when running this test.
Papers reporting this test generally did it with third- or fourth-degree polynomials.
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Heaping at multiples of five could also affect the RDD estimates of the effect of EPL on
training, as observations at each multiple of five can be considered as a mixture of observa-
tions for which employment has been correctly reported, observations for which employment
size is rounded upward and observations for which it is rounded downward. When focus-
ing on firms with 15 employees, heaping means that some observations at 15 are, in reality,
below the threshold while others are above. This should produce a misclassification error
and reduce the RDD estimates in the presence of a true effect of EPL (Lewbel 2007). To
address this concern, we follow the suggestion of Barreca et al. (2016) and focus our base-
line estimates on the sample that drops the data at reporting heaps, for which employment
size should be correctly (or more precisely) reported, and which yields an unbiased estimate
of the treatment effect for ‘non-heaped types’. However, in the robustness checks, we also
report the estimates in the sample retaining the heaped observations.
To check for manipulation, some papers have reported balancing tests of some firm char-
acteristics around the cut-off. Sorting according to the covariates would bias the RDD esti-
mates only if they are correlated with firm-provided training. Unfortunately, many of these
covariates are not predetermined but may instead act as mediating factors for the effect of
EPL. Thus, checking for balancing will not help judge the validity of the RDD. To take a few
examples, firm characteristics affected by EPL and which also interact with worker training
may include investments in physical capital (Cingano et al. 2016; 2010), access to credit
(Cingano et al. 2016), innovation performance (Koeniger 2005), use of temporary contracts
(Hijzen et al. 2017), wages (Leonardi and Pica 2013), and workers’ mismatch (Berton et al.
2017). In Section 5.4 we check the sensitivity of our estimates to including in the regressions
some of these covariates, which are available in the ISFOL-RIL survey, and further discuss
their role in mediating the effect of EPL on firm-provided training.
5.2 Main results
Our baseline estimates are reported in Table 3. For each model, we report the RDD coef-
ficient, the p-value, the order of the polynomial (one or two), the number of observations
to the left (N. obs. L.) and to the right (N. obs. R.) of the cut-off, the estimated left (Band
L.) and right (Band R.) bandwidths, the use of strategies to address heaping (H) or ‘donut-
hole’ regressions (D), and two columns indicating whether industry and region fixed effects
are included in the estimation. For all models, except models III and IV, which use the
heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimator, we report the cluster-robust variance estima-
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tor and remove heaped observations (i.e. multiples of five), which might bias our estimates
(Barreca et al. 2016). The estimated effect of employment protection (i.e. stricter firing re-
strictions above the 15-employee threshold) is 1.48 fewer trained workers (p-value=0.017)
with a first-degree polynomial and −1.94 trained workers (p-value=0.007) with a second-
degree polynomial. These decreases correspond to 16% and 20% reductions in the number
of trained workers at the cut-off, respectively. We consider the estimates in models I and II
as our baselines, and present in the remaining rows some robustness checks.
[Table 3 about here]
The estimates in rows III and IV, which use the heteroskedasticity-robust variance esti-
mator, are practically indistinguishable from those reported in the first two rows. However,
because of the discrete nature of our forcing variable, in the remainder of the analysis we
stick to the use of standard errors clustered at the employment level, as suggested by Lee and
Card (2008).34
In rows V and VI, we check the robustness of our results to re-including heaped ob-
servations. When using a first-degree polynomial (model V), estimates are not reported by
rdrobust.35 On the contrary, using a second-degree polynomial in model VI, the estimated
coefficient is −3.6, larger than in our baseline estimates, and is statistically significant at the
1% level.
In models VII-X we check the robustness of our estimates to including industry and
region fixed effects. In a RDD design, the main goal of including covariates is just to increase
precision; in turn, if the RDD assumptions are valid, the inclusion of covariates should not
greatly affect the estimates. Using industry fixed effects, the RDD coefficients in models VII-
VIII slightly increase, to −1.68 (p-value=0.005) and −2.33 (p-value=0.001), respectively.
The estimates controlling for region fixed effects remain virtually unchanged with respect to
the baseline. As expected, including the fixed effects makes the estimates more precise.
As we stressed in Section 5.1, we do not have information about the type of contracts with
which employees in 2009 were hired and cannot build the ‘legal’ size of the firm (which is
relevant for EPL). We have to rely only on head counts. This means that some firms above
15 employees can actually be below the threshold (e.g. if firms employ part-time workers).
34 When the forcing variable is discrete, as in our case, it is not possible to compare units just below and just
above the threshold. Lee and Card (2008) suggest modelling the difference between the expected value of the
outcome variable and the predicted value from the selected functional form as a random specification error; the
latter gives rise to a cluster error structure, where the cluster variable is the forcing variable.
35 When considering heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, we find a reduction of 1.9 workers, although
it is estimated with some noise (the p-value is 0.11).
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Thus, in models XI and XII, we report the estimates of a ‘donut-hole’ regression in which
firms with 16 employees are dropped from the sample.36 The estimated effects with first-
and second-degree polynomials are −1.01 and −1.85, respectively, which are statistically
significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
5.3 Different dependent variables and further robustness checks
Up until now, we have focused our attention on the number of trained workers. Panel (a)
of Table 4 reports the estimates for our baseline specifications (i.e. models I and II of Table
3) using different dependent variables. In particular, we consider the proportion of trained
workers, the number of trained workers for firms using prevalently or exclusively their own
funds for training, and the training expenditure (in euros). Model I (II) points to a statistically
significant reduction of 5.5 points (−9.0 points) in the percentage of trained workers asso-
ciated with EPL when a first-degree (second-degree) polynomial is used.37 Focusing only
on the firms that exclusively or mostly used their own funds to bear training costs does not
change the point estimates of the EPL effect, which are −1.54 (p-value=0.008) and −1.88
(p-value=0.005) with first- and second-degree polynomials, respectively.
[Table 4 about here]
The results are less robust when the expenditure on training is used as the dependent vari-
able, presumably owing to a larger measurement error affecting the variable or the smaller
sample size. In this case, the specification using a first-degree polynomial gives an estimate
of EUR −233 in the expenditure, which is, however, statistically insignificant. By contrast,
the estimate is much larger (−888) and significant at the 5% level when a second-degree
polynomial is used.
In panel (b) of Table 4 we show further robustness checks. Models VII and VIII report
the results of a placebo analysis in which the cut-off for firing restrictions is set at 12 employ-
ees. In this case, we expect a much lower effect of EPL owing to the misclassification of the
treatment Di. Indeed, both with a first-degree (model VII) and with a second-degree poly-
nomial (model VIII) the effect is very small, 0.22 and 0.18, respectively, and statistically
insignificant at conventional levels. Models IX and X use coverage error optimal band-
widths, and the estimated effects are −1.64 (p-value=0.017) and −2.15 (p-value=0.028),
36 Firms with 15 employees are already removed because of heaping.
37 We are reporting these estimates even though Cingano et al. (2016) suggest not using dependent variables
that are normalised by the running variable.
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respectively.38 Finally, the last two rows of the table use a different kernel (Epanechnikov
instead of a triangular kernel), which yields larger estimates, −2.31 (p-value=0.029) and
−2.12 (p-value=0.013) with first- and second-degree polynomials, respectively.
5.4 Discussion: confounding and mediating factors
In Table 5, we investigate some potential factors that may confound or mediate the effect of
EPL on training. We start with potential confounding variables in panel (a). Italian legisla-
tion mandates that workers in firms with more than 15 employees have the right to constitute
unitary workplace union structures (work councils) called Rappresentanze Sindacali Azien-
dali (RSA) in accordance with Article 19 of the Workers’ Statute.39 Unions may have an
interest in promoting worker training to increase their productivity and wages, and also their
value to the firm through acquisition of firm-specific human capital. Thus, the presence of
work councils in the firm may confound the effect of EPL, making it more positive.40 Luck-
ily, our dataset provides information about the presence of union structures within the firm,
so we can include, in the RDD regressions, a dichotomous indicator for the presence of an
RSU or an RSA. The results in models I and II of Table 5 are very robust to the inclusion of
the work council indicator, with statistically significant estimates of −1.51 and −1.80 with
first- and second-degree polynomials, respectively.
[Table 5 about here]
Another potential confounding factor that may interfere with EPL is the so-called Cassa
Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (CIGS), which is a short-time work programme com-
prising an extraordinary worker redundancy fund scheme. CIGS aims to help firms that
are in the process of reorganisation and restructuring, those that have been facing a severe
economic crisis and those that are undergoing an insolvency procedure. The CIGS scheme
relieves those firms from the costs of the unused workforce by providing income benefit to
the workers affected. The Italian legislation, for the period related to this study, mandated
that only firms above the 15-employee threshold could apply for CIGS; by way of contrast,
38 The coverage error optimal bandwidth is an alternative methodology to choose the bandwidth that seeks
to build a confidence interval for the RDD effect with the asymptotic smallest coverage error rate. It generally
leads to selecting a smaller bandwidth around the threshold. See Cattaneo et al. (2017).
39 Another form of workers’ representation in the firm are the Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie (RSU)
created by a national agreement between the most representative trade unions and the main employers confed-
erations at the beginning of the 1990s.
40 Booth et al. (2003) report that, in the UK, union-covered workers were more likely to receive training and
also received more training days, relative to non-union workers. Dustmann and Schönberg (2009) use German
data to show that union recognition, via the imposition of minimum wages and wage compression, led to more
training in the case of an apprenticeship programme.
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all firms could apply for another scheme, known as Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria
(CIGO) — ordinary worker redundancy fund scheme — which, in turn, can be requested
by firms facing temporary financial difficulties. In general, firms with a high proportion of
workers under CIG schemes are also likely to provide less training, as their level of activity
is decreasing; as a result, the presence of a CIG scheme appears to be making the negative
effect of EPL larger. In models III and IV, we control for a dummy variable equal to one if
the firm has made use of either CIGO or CIGS and we show that the estimated EPL effect is
virtually unaffected by the inclusion of the CIG indicator.
In panel (b) we discuss instead some potential mediating factors for the effect of EPL. In
particular, EPL may affect several firms’ characteristics, which in turn interact with training
provision. The first of these factors can be a firm’s investment in physical capital. It seems
fair to say that both theoretical and empirical studies do not agree on the direction of the effect
of stricter EPL on physical capital investment. Indeed, in competitive models of the labour
market, higher EPL, by increasing the costs of labour, can lead to capital-labour substitution,
as is empirically shown by, for instance, Cingano et al. (2016). In turn, in models with
frictions, EPL might exacerbate hold-up problems and lead to lower investment per worker,
as found by Cingano et al. (2010). Moreover, if physical capital and firm-specific human
capital are complementary inputs into a firm’s production function, the capital intensity of
a firm can increase following a tightening of EPL, as in the model of Wasmer and Janiak
(2014), which predicts a U-shaped relationship between physical capital intensity and EPL.
Therefore, the possible complementarity between training and physical capital accumulation
predicted by some theoretical models might affect the relationship between firm-provided
training and EPL, which we uncover in our RDD estimates. However, models V and VI
give little support to this hypothesis. Indeed, the estimated effects of EPL remain substantial
when firms’ investment is controlled for, with point estimates of −1.516 (p-value=0.008)
and −2.117 (p-value=0.002) with first- and second-degree polynomials, respectively, which
are very close to our baseline specification.
EPL may also interact with firms’ innovation. Several papers have investigated, both
theoretically and empirically, the effect of employment protection on innovation, generally
reporting positive effects. Bastgen and Holzner (2017) formulate an equilibrium match-
ing model, in which firms facing higher employment protection, which negatively affects
productivity, invest in R&D or buy new technologies to restore their productivity. They
calibrate the model on US data, replicating the association between EPL and innovation.
Similar evidence of a positive association between the two variables was found by Griffith
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and Macartney (2014), who report that multinational enterprises do a larger proportion of
innovative activity in countries with high EPL, although the same multinationals perform a
higher proportion of radical innovation in countries with low EPL because the latter requires
more adjustment of the workforce.41 Acharya et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence for
the positive effect of EPL on innovation using the staggered adoption of wrongful discharge
laws across US states, and they explain the effect with a theoretical model in which EPL en-
hances employees’ innovative efforts and encourages firms to invest in risky but potentially
mould-breaking projects. If training and innovation are complementary (e.g. adoption of
new production processes or production of new goods require more worker training), inno-
vation may account for a big part of the effect of EPL on training. To test this hypothesis, we
control in our baseline specification for either a dummy variable equal to one, for those firms
that had introduced in the previous 3 years a product or a process innovation (models VII and
VIII, respectively), or a dummy equal to one, for firms that have bought/registered patents
in the previous 3 years (models IX and X). In both cases, the estimates are only marginally
affected.
Finally, some recent literature has suggested that, in the presence of dual labour markets,
firms may try to avoid the costs associated with stricter EPL for regular workers by making
greater use of temporary contracts. Moreover, when firing costs for regular workers are
high and there are rules forbidding temporary contract renewal, firms might be reluctant to
convert temporary jobs into permanent ones. This might, as a result, increase the incentives
for firms to rely on temporary jobs in sequence (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002), thereby
increasing (excessive) worker turnover. Cahuc et al. (2016) present a search and matching
model featuring regular jobs (with possibly stricter EPL) and temporary contracts (which
can be terminated at zero cost when they expire, but which cannot be terminated before their
expiry date): they show that, in their model, stricter EPL for regular workers leads firms
to employ the latter only to exploit production opportunities that are expected to last for a
very long time. This, in turn, can lead to an important substitution of temporary jobs with
permanent ones, leading to a ‘strong excess of labour turnover’. This theoretical prediction
also seems to be borne out by the data. Indeed, Hijzen et al. (2017) show that, in the case
of Italy, the stricter EPL above the 15-employee threshold is associated with higher rates of
excessive worker turnover, defined as the excess of worker turnover over the absolute value
of net employment change, the latter in turn measured as the difference between hiring and
41 Saint-Paul (2002) builds a theoretical model in which researchers in countries with higher EPL tend to
specialise in ‘secondary innovation’, which improves existing products, rather than ‘primary innovation’, which
introduces new products.
20
separation rates. Interestingly, the authors also found that this effect is entirely explained
by greater use of temporary workers above the threshold. Similar evidence can be found in
Centeno and Novo (2012), who report an increase in the proportion of fixed-term contracts
following a Portuguese reform that tightened EPL for regular workers in the case of firms
with 11 to 20 workers.
Because there is evidence that temporary workers receive less training (Booth et al.
2002), it might well be the case that the negative association between higher EPL and firm-
sponsored training in our data is, at least in part, explained by the higher reallocation rates
induced by stricter EPL. To test this hypothesis, in models XI and XII we control for exces-
sive worker reallocation rates at the firm level. The latter is defined, following Hijzen et al.
(2017), as EWT = 2 ·min(H,S)/E, where H and S are the number of hirings and separations,
respectively, and E is average firm employment.42 Contrary to the previous regressions, we
note that, once we control for excessive worker turnover, the magnitude of the effect of EPL
on firm-provided training is about halved, and it is no longer statistically significant at con-
ventional levels. This result suggests that, in a dual labour market, EPL might not affect
training directly, but instead via worker turnover. Indeed, as discussed previously, stricter
EPL might induce firms to increase worker turnover by using more temporary workers, who,
in turn, receive less training.
To give some additional support to this interpretation, in Table 6 we report a RDD exer-
cise in which we explore the effect of EPL on excessive worker turnover, as in Hijzen et al.
(2017). The results displayed in models I and II point towards a statistically significant in-
crease in the excessive worker turnover rates above the threshold. Moreover, in model III
we also demonstrate that, above the threshold, the proportion of workers with a fixed-term
contract is significantly higher.43
[Table 6 about here]
These results suggest that, in a two-tier labour market, higher firing costs for regular
workers lead firms to increase the excessive turnover of workers by substituting temporary
positions for regular ones, as argued by Hijzen et al. (2017); in turn, temporary workers tend
to receive less training because of their shorter expected tenure within the firm. As a result,
in a dual labour market, stricter EPL might be associated with less firm-provided training.
42 It can easily be shown that this formula is equivalent to the definition of excessive worker reallocation
as the difference between worker turnover and the absolute value of net employment change: it therefore
represents worker flows in excess of job flows, and it is sometimes referred to as churning (Burgess et al.
2000).
43 We show only the result with a linear polynomial because estimates are not reported by rdrobust with a
second-order polynomial.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have exploited Italy’s size-contingent firing restrictions for permanent work-
ers in a sharp RDD framework to identify the impact of stricter EPL for regular workers on
firm-provided training.
Our baseline results, which are conducted using the non-parametric local polynomial
estimation method of Calonico et al. (2014), suggest that the number of trained workers falls
by about 1.5− 1.9 units at the 15-employees threshold, depending on model specification:
this is not a negligible effect because it corresponds to a 16%-20% reduction in the number of
trained workers. Results are robust to an extensive set of sensitivity checks, such as placebo
analysis, ‘donut-hole’ RDD analysis and controls for possible confounders (e.g. the presence
of certain work councils within the firm that Italian law envisages for firms with more than
15 employees).
However, our results also suggest that the negative effect of stricter EPL above the 15-
employee threshold is largely mediated by the higher excessive worker turnover associated
with stricter EPL above the threshold. Indeed, and confirming the results of Hijzen et al.
(2017) on a different dataset, we show that, at the threshold, firms are characterised by a
much higher excessive worker turnover and more use of temporary workers, as theoretically
predicted by Cahuc et al. (2016) for economies characterised by a two-tier labour market.
In other words, in labour markets characterised by a significant asymmetry in the degree of
employment protection enjoyed by permanent and temporary workers, there is an incentive
for firms to substitute temporary for permanent workers by using a succession of temporary
contracts (Cahuc et al. 2016), thereby creating excessive worker turnover. However, because
temporary workers generally receive less training (Booth et al. 2002), stricter employment
protection legislation for permanent workers might reduce incentives for firms to provide
training.
This finding might provide an additional explanation for why two-tier reforms might be
associated with a drop in labour productivity: indeed, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) explain
the reduction in labour productivity following a two-tier labour market liberalisation as the
consequence of a transitory increase in temporary employment coupled with the decreas-
ing marginal returns associated with a downward sloping labour demand.44 Our empirical
findings, in turn, suggest that, by favouring the growth of temporary workers, a large gap be-
tween the EPL relating to permanent and temporary workers might lead to less firm-provided
44 See also Cahuc et al. (2016).
22
training and, possibly, to lower labour productivity, as found by Hijzen et al. (2017). This, in
turn, may have played a role in explaining the dismal productivity performance of the Italian
economy since the second half of the 1990s.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Firm size distribution (2009)
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Note. The left panel of the figure shows the histogram of the frequency of firm size in 2009 and the right panel
the McCrary (2008) test for the presence of discontinuities in the difference in the log density of firm size.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
full sample
employees 16,830 64.25 442.15
trained workers 6,377 71.44 481.33
training share 6,377 0.63 0.34
cost of training 5,692 78168 2085484
excess worker reallocation 10,842 0.92 8.81
share of temporary workers 16,481 0.12 0.23
unions 16,665 0.17 0.38
cassa integrazione 16,797 0.18 0.38
total investment 16,282 1830845 69966073
innovation 16,757 0.45 0.50
patents 16,775 0.04 0.19
first order polynomial
employees 5,876 26.22 16.82
trained workers 2,659 15.95 14.41
training share 2,659 0.58 0.35
cost of training 2,381 30351 1025431
excess worker reallocation 4,683 0.46 1.68
share of temporary workers 5,846 0.11 0.18
unions 5,738 0.22 0.41
cassa integrazione 5,863 0.24 0.43
total investment 5,656 620136 14176036
innovation 5,847 0.52 0.50
patents 5,860 0.05 0.21
second order polynomial
employees 9,751 26.14 28.24
trained workers 4,202 17.25 21.89
training share 4,202 0.59 0.35
cost of training 3,760 23022 816507
excess worker reallocation 7,357 0.52 1.67
share of temporary workers 9,694 0.11 0.19
unions 9,596 0.18 0.39
cassa integrazione 9,730 0.23 0.42
total investment 9,412 759538 16121276
innovation 9,707 0.50 0.50
patents 9,726 0.04 0.20
Note. We eliminate heaps at multiples of 5. Employees is the total number of employees in 2009. Training
dummy is equal to 1 if firm has provided training to any worker during the year and 0 otherwise; trained
workers is the number of workers trained. We imputed trained workers equal to employees when number of
trained was greater than the number of employees; we imputed 0 when this information was missing. Training
share is calculated as the share of trained employees in 2009 imposing upper bound to number of employees.
Cost of training is the original variable expressed in euros. Excess worker reallocation is calculated at the firm
level following Hijzen et al. (2017), as EWT = 2 ·min(H,S)/E, where H and S are the number of hiring and
separations, respectively, and E is average firm employment. Share of temporary workers is the share of fixed
term contracts. Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) is a dummy for firms with a short-time work arrangement
with redundancy fund in place. Union is a dummy for works councils. Total investment is expressed in euros.
Innovation and patents are dummies for product (or process) innovation and patents at the firm level.
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Table 2: Firm sorting below the 15-employee threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables ST ST ST ST RDD RDD RDD RDD
13 employees -0.001 -0.001 -0.010 -0.011
(0.040) (0.064) (0.106) (0.106)
14 employees -0.091** -0.092 -0.112 -0.116
(0.041) (0.090) (0.216) (0.216)
15 employees -0.031 -0.034 -0.070 -0.082
(0.050) (0.128) (0.389) (0.389)
15 or less employees -0.004 -0.016 -0.042 -0.055
(0.038) (0.062) (0.098) (0.159)
Observations 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274 8274
R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030
Linear polynomial Yes No No No Yes No No No
Quadratic polynomial No Yes No No No Yes No No
Cubic polynomial No No Yes No No No Yes No
Quartic polynomial No No No Yes No No No Yes
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1)-(4) report the
results of a specification similar to Schivardi and Torrini (2008) (ST), including a polynomial in firm size and
indicators for 13, 14 and 15 employees, while columns (5)-(6) report the results of a standard RDD specification
(RDD). In columns (1)-(4) the polynomial is in firm size and in (5)-(8) in firm size−15. All polynomials are
allowed to be different on each side of the 15-employee threshold. All models also include industry fixed
effects. The estimation sample only includes firms with between 6 and 25 employees.
Table 3: Baseline results
Model Coeff. p-value P N. obs L. N. obs R. Band L. Band R. Heaping / Region f.e. Industry f.e.
donut-hole
I -1.481 0.017 1 813 1846 5 64.26 H no no
II -1.945 0.007 2 1300 2314 7.809 127.941 H no no
III(a) -1.521 0.061 1 813 1799 5.477 60.152 H no no
IV(a) -1.841 0.041 2 1874 2292 9.584 123.995 H no no
V n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. no no no
VI -3.584 0.004 2 611 2978 3.058 129.244 no no no
VII -1.681 0.005 1 813 1745 7.628 213.374 H no yes
VIII -2.326 0.001 2 1300 2323 7.4 110.978 H no yes
IX -1.392 0.025 1 813 1822 7.858 235.995 H yes no
X -1.877 0.006 2 1300 2299 7.805 124.103 H yes no
XI -1.011 0.048 1 813 1434 5.57 39.817 D no no
XII -1.850 0.009 2 1874 2107 9.795 109.464 D no no
Note. P = order of the polynomial; N. obs L. = number of observations on the left of the cut-off; N. obs. R.
= number of observations on the right of the cut-off; Band L. = bandwidth on the left of the cut-off; Band R.
= bandwidth on the right of the cut-off. H stands for Heaping and D for donut-hole. Estimates and p-values
are bias-corrected RDD estimates with the cluster robust variance estimator, with the exception of models
II(a) and III(a), which report bias-corrected RD estimates with the heteroskedasticity robust variance estimator.
All regressions use a triangular kernel and a mean squared error optimal bandwidth. In all specifications we
eliminate heaps at multiples of 5 (5, 10,..., 80), with the exception of models V and VI. All regressions are
estimated using the Calonico et al. (2017) rdrobust routine for STATA.
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Table 4: Robustness
Model Coeff. p-value P N. obs L. N. obs R. Band L. Band R.
Different depedent variable
I Share trained -0.055 0.01 1 2551 2765 12 271.056
II Share trained -0.090 0.001 2 2211 3007 11.014 492.647
III Own funds -1.545 0.008 1 736 1583 4.426 59.059
IV Own funds -1.879 0.005 2 1409 2095 8.859 140.354
V Expenditure -233.890 0.239 1 649 1283 5.158 48.938
VI Expenditure -888.530 0.011 2 1404 1705 9.293 110.833
Robustness checks
VII Placebo 0.227 0.195 1 1263 2303 7.235 52.867
VIII Placebo 0.185 0.194 2 1600 2834 8.686 113.908
IX Coverage error -1.641 0.017 1 611 1639 3.599 46.427
X Coverage error -2.150 0.028 2 813 2069 5.387 88.248
XI Different Kernel -2.315 0.029 1 402 1776 2.441 57.589
XII Different Kernel -2.122 0.013 2 1061 2271 6.231 118.287
Note. P = order of the polynomial; N. obs L. = number of observations on the left of the cut-off; N. obs. R. =
number of observations on the right of the cut-off; Band L. = bandwidth on the left of the cut-off; Band R. =
bandwidth on the right of the cut-off. Estimates and p-values are bias-corrected RD estimates with the cluster
robust variance estimator. All regressions use a triangular kernel and a mean squared error optimal bandwidth.
In all specifications we eliminate heaps at multiples of 5 (5, 10,..., 80) with the exception of models V and VI.
All regressions are estimated using the Calonico et al. (2017) rdrobust routine for STATA.
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Table 5: Confounding and mediating factors
Model Control Coeff. p-value P N. obs L. N. obs R. Band L. Band R.
Confounding factors
I Union -1.511 0.017 1 808 1798 5 66.636
II Union -1.803 0.011 2 1869 2252 9.203 130.816
III CIG -1.408 0.024 1 812 1844 5 64
IV CIG -1.861 0.009 2 1299 2314 8 128
Mediating factors
V Investment -1.516 0.008 1 783 1629 4.696 51.131
VI Investment -2.117 0.002 2 1255 2072 7.561 102.482
VII Innovation -1.562 0.011 1 810 1817 5.029 62.726
VIII Innovation -2.005 0.005 2 1297 2308 7.846 127.674
IX Patents -1.457 0.018 1 810 1844 4.998 64.191
X Patents -1.937 0.007 1 1297 2310 7.822 127.299
XI Worker turnover -0.739 0.252 1 1761 1713 15 73.759
XII Worker turnover -0.764 0.251 2 1761 2216 15 157.867
Note. P = order of the polynomial; N. obs L. = number of observations on the left of the cut-off; N. obs. R.
= number of observations on the right of the cut-off; Band L. = bandwidth on the left of the cut-off; Band R.
= bandwidth on the right of the cut-off. CIG is a dummy for firms that used the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni
(short-time work programme with a worker redundancy fund) scheme; investment is the total amount of invest-
ment; innovation is a dummy for firms that implemented either a process of a product innovation in the past 3
years; patents is a dummy for firms that have filed or purchased a patent in the past 3 years; worker turnover
is the excessive worker turnover described in the data section; and estimates and p-values are bias-corrected
RD estimates with the cluster robust variance estimator. All regressions use a triangular kernel and a mean
squared error optimal bandwidth. In all specifications, we eliminate heaps at multiples of 5 (5, 10,..., 80) with
the exception of models V and VI. All regressions are estimated using the Calonico et al. (2017) rdrobust
routine for STATA.
Table 6: Worker reallocation and temporary workers
Model Model Model
I II III
Coeff. 0.248 0.266 0.054
p-value 0.000 0.072 0.008
P 1 2 1
N. obs L. 717 1105 2153
N. obs R. 2989 4020 3997
Band L. 2.402 3.744 5.296
Band R. 52.765 154.093 84.287
Note. P = order of the polynomial; N. obs L.= number of observations on the left of the cut-off; N. obs
R.= number of observations on the right of the cut-off; Band L = bandwidth on the left of the cut-off; Band
R.= bandwidth on the right of the cut-off. Estimates and p−values are bias-corrected RD estimates with the
cluster robust variance estimator. The dependent variable is excessive worker reallocation (models I and II) and
the share of temporary workers (model III). All regressions use a triangular kernel and a mean squared error
optimal bandwidth. In all specifications, we eliminate heaps at multiples of 5 (5, 10,..., 80). All regressions are
estimated using the Calonico et al. (2017) rdrobust routine for STATA.
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